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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION ACT OF 1970

SCOPE NOTE

The purpose of this discussion of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 19701 (hereinafter referred to as "ACJA") will be
to analyze the recently enacted legislation by explaining the
changes it has instituted in appellate jurisdiction in the courts of
the Commonwealth and by exploring the merits of such transfers. The following sections will also compare "ACJA" to ideal
court structures and model acts which have been proposed by
various authorities.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1968 Pennsylvania took a major step in the movement toward modernizing its judicial system. On April 23 of that year,
article v. of the Constitution of 1874 was repealed and a new judiciary article (the present article v.) was adopted. The new article
is simple in form. This type of judicial article has been praised
by many modern writers. 2 A simplified judicial article does not
rigidly set out all the details of the judicial system; it rather sets
up the skeletal framework and permits another branch of the
government (legislative or judicial) to fill in the details as the
times and circumstances require.3 If these details were contained in the Constitution, the burdensome process of constitutional amendment would be required to change the details each
time they became outdated. Such change would be achieved much
easier through the normal legislative process. 4 Pennsylvania's ju-

dicial article, adopting this rationale, simply establishes the various courts of the Commonwealth and permits the General Assembly to establish the jurisdiction of these courts in accordance with
5
the demands of the time.
1. Act No. 223 (Sept. 11, 1970).
2. E.g., R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF THE CounTs 50 (1940); THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 19671968, THE JUDICIARY § 6.1 (Reference Manual No. 5).
3.

THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, THE PENNSYLVANIA

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION 1967-1968, THE JUDICIARY § 6.1 (Reference Manual No. 5).
4. R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS 277 (1940).
5. PA. CONST. art. V, reads in part:
§ 2. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court (a) shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in this court shall be reposed the supreme
judicial power of the Commonwealth;
(b) shall consist of seven justices, one of whom shall be the

The new judicial article establishes a unified judicial system in Pennsylvania 6 and vests administrative authority over this
7
judicial system in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Finally, the present article v. calls for the establishment of a
Commonwealth Court to be effective January 1, 1970.8 On January 6, 1970, the Legislature passed the Commonwealth Court Act
establishing such a court and setting forth its jurisdiction. The
Chief Justice; and
(c) shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law.
§ 3. Superior Court
The Superior Court shall consist of seven judges, one of whom
shall be the president judge, and its jurisdiction shall be as
provided by law.
§ 4. Commonwealth Court
The Commonwealth Court shall be a statewide court, and
shall consist of the number of judges and have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law.
6. PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 1.
7. Id. § 10(a).
8. PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 4 calls for the establishment of a Commonwealth Court.
SCHEDULE TO JUDiciARY ARTcLE, § 3 calls for the Court to come into
existence on January 1, 1970.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.1-211.15 (Supp. 1970). Id. § 211.8 sets
up its jurisdiction. It states:
§ 211.8 Jurisdiction; powers
a) The court shall have original jurisdiction of:
(1) All civil actions or proceedings, jurisdiction of which is vested
in the court by Act of Assembly.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section: (i) all
civil actions and proceedings by the Commonwealth or any officer
thereof acting in his official capacity- (ii) all civil actions and
proceedings against the Commonwealth, but this clause shall not
be construed as a waiver by the Commonwealth of immunity to
suit; (iii) all actions against the officers of the Commonwealth in
their official capacity.
(3) All civil actions or proceedings, jurisdiction of which is transferred to the court by section 14 of this act.
b) The jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section shall be
exclusive of the courts of common pleas except with respect to actions and proceedings by the Commonwealth or any officer thereof,
acting in his official capacity, where the jurisdictions of the
court shall be concurrent with the courts of common pleas.
c) The court shall have the appellate jurisdiction of:
(1) All appeals, jurisdiction of which is vested in the court by Act
of Assembly; and
(2) All appeals, jurisdiction of which is transferred to the court
by section 14 of this act.
d) The jurisdiction of the court under subsection (c) of this section shall be exclusive.
e) The Court shall not have original jurisdiction under clause (2)
of subsection (a) of this section or under section 14 of this act of:
(1) Any action or proceeding in the nature of an application for
writ of habeas corpus or post conviction relief not ancillary to
proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the court.
(2) Any action or proceeding under the Eminent Domain Code.
(3) Any action or proceeding involving the interpretation, application or enforcement of an Act of Assembly which expressly vests
jurisdiction in the courts of common pleas generally to entertain
actions or proceedings relating to the interpretation, application or
enforcement of such act.
f) When a court or administrative agency, in making an interlocutory order in a proceeding in which its final order would be
within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court, shall be of the

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

enactment of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act on July 31,
1970 implements in part article v. of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. That article provides that the Supreme Court, the Superior
Court, and the Commonwealth Court shall "have such jurisdiction
as shall be provided by law."10
With regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, article v.,
section 2(c) represents a change from the previous article
v., section 3 (Constitution of 1874, art. v. section 3). Under the
repealed article v., section 3, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was enumerated, while its appellate jurisdiction
was to be provided by law." The present article v., section 2 sets
forth no specific jurisdiction for the court, but allows its jurisdiction, both appellate and original, to be provided by law.' 2 This is
in keeping with the modern trend toward simple and flexible conopinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the proceeding, it shall so state in such
order. The Commonwealth Court may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after service of notice of entry of the
order. Application for an appeal under this subsection shall not
stay proceedings before the lower court or administrative agency
unless the lower court or agency or Commonwealth Court or a
judge thereof shall so order.
g) The court shall have the power to issue, under its judicial
seal, every lawful writ and process necessary or suitable for the
exercise of the jurisdiction given by this act and for the enforcement of any order which it may make, including such writs and
process to or to be served or enforced by sheriffs and other officers
of courts and political subdivisions as the courts of common pleas
are authorized by law or usage to issue, and except as otherwise
provided by general rules, to make such rules and orders of the
court as the interest of justice or the business of the court may
require.
h) The court shall also have all powers of a court of record possessed by the courts of common pleas and all powers necessary or
appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction which are agreeable
to the usages and principles of law.
10. PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2(c) reads: "The Supreme Court . . . shall
have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law."
PA. CONsT. art. V, § 3 states: "The Superior Court shall consist of
seven judges. . . and its jurisdiction shall be as provided by law."
PA. CONST. art. V, § 4 states: "The Commonwealth Court shall .
have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law."
11. PA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1874) provides:
. . . they shall have original jurisdiction in cases of injunction
where a corporation is a party defendant, of habeas corpus, of
mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction, and of quo warranto as
to all officers of the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends
over the State, but shall not exercise any other original jurisdiction; they shall have appellate jurisdiction by appeal, certiorari or
writ of error in all cases, as is now or may hereafter be provided
by law.
12. PA. CONST. art. V, § 2(c), supra note 10.

stitutional provisions regarding the judiciary. 13
Prior to September 11, 1970, the effective date of "ACJA", the
Supreme and Superior Courts were to exercise the same jurisdiction as they did before the present article v. was adopted in 1968.
The Schedule to the Judiciary Article provides that the Supreme

Court:
[SIhall exercise all the powers and, until otherwise provided by law, jurisdiction now vested in the present Supreme Court and, until otherwise provided by law, the
accused in all cases of felonious homicide
shall have the
14
right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
And section 2 of the Schedule provides, "until otherwise provided by law, the Superior Court shall exercise all the jurisdiction
now vested in the present Superior Court."15 With the passage of
"ACJA" the jurisdiction of both these courts has been changed in
certain respects and the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court
has been incorporated into it and expanded. Therefore, Pennsylvania now has a codification of the jurisdiction of its appellate

courts.
II.

OUTLINE OF THE ACT

Before discussing the changes in the jurisdiction of the various courts and other changes in appellate procedure which have
been brought about by "ACJA," a detailed outline of the jurisdic13. A.B.A. SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, DRAFT OF A MODEL JUDICIARY ARTICLE FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1960); PROPOSALS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AUTHORIZED BY THE VOTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA UNDER
ACT No. 2 OF THE 1967 SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE,
COMMENTS ON THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS AND STATEMENT REGARDING THE PROPOSED JUDICIARY ARTICLE (1966).
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DRAFT § 2 (b) states:
Appeals From a Judgment of the District Court Imposing A Sentence Of Death Or Life Imprisonment, Or Imprisonment For A
Term of 25 Years or More, Shall Be Taken Directly To The Supreme Court. In All Other Cases, Criminal And Civil, The Supreme Court Shall Exercise Appellate Jurisdiction Under Such
Terms and Conditions As It Shall Specify In Rules, Except That
Such Rules Shall Provide That A Defendant Shall Have An Absolute Right To One Appeal In All Criminal Cases.
After discussing the inclusion in the Article of a right of appeal for
sentences involving death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for 25
years or more the Committee Comment states: "As to other matters it was
believed that the appellate power shall be exercised in accordance with
the demands of the times." The Pennsylvania Bar Association Proposal,
Section 2, states:
Appeals from final judgments of the District Court shall be as of
right directly to the Supreme Court only in cases of judgments
imposing sentences of death or life imprisonment. In all other
cases, appeals permitted by law shall be assigned by the Supreme
Court to such court, including the Superior Court, as the Supreme
Court shall by rule prescribe.
As can be seen, wide discretion is allowed as to what class of cases
the Supreme Court should be required to hear on appeal.
14. SCHEDULE TO JUDICIARY ARTICLE § 3.
15. Id. § 2.
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tion of the various courts under this act will be given, since such an
outline is essential for complete understanding of the subsequent
sections of this Comment.
Supreme Court
"ACJA" gives the Supreme Court original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of "... all cases of habeas corpus,16 mandamus or
prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction, 17 and quo warranto
as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction."' 8 Under Section 202,
the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of final
orders from the courts of common pleas in cases of "... felonious
homicide, 19 the right to public office, 20 matters decided in the orphans' court division," 21 actions or proceedings in equity with
certain exceptions which will be noted in the discussion of the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court, 22 direct criminal contempt in common pleas and other contempt proceedings relating to
orders appealable directly to the Supreme Court,23 suspension or
disbarment from legal practice and "disciplinary orders or sanctions relating thereto; 24 supersession of a district attorney by an
Attorney General or by a court, 25 matters where the right or
power of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision to create
or issue indebtedness is drawn in direct question ... ,,26 and
appeals where a law has been declared unconstitutional by
the courts of common pleas. 27 The Supreme Court also has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final orders in matters which were
originally begun in the Commonwealth Court and which were
not an appeal to that court. 28 It is also permitted to hear appeals
from orders of the Commonwealth Court in cases appealed there
29
from the Board of Finance and Revenue.
Section 204 establishes allocatur for the Supreme Court upon
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Act No. 223, § 201(1) (Sept. 11, 1970).
Id. § 201(2).
Id. § 201(3).
Id. § 202(1).
Id. § 202(2).
Id. § 202(3).
Id. § 202(4).
Id. § 202(5).
Id. § 202(6).
Id. § 202(7).
Id. § 202(8).
Id. § 202(9).
Id. § 203.

29.

Id.

30
allowance by any two justices.
Finally, the Supreme Court can assume plenary jurisdiction
of any matter of great public importance which is pending before
any justice of the peace or court of the Commonwealth. 3 '

Superior Court
The Superior Court is given no original jurisdiction. Exceptions are made for actions of mandamus or prohibition to courts
of inferior jurisdiction if they are ancillary to matters within its
appellate jurisidiction and for the issuance of writs of habeas
corpus when ancillary to matters within its appellate jurisdic32

tion.

The Superior Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
all final orders of the courts of common pleas except those "within
the exclusive jurisdiction of either the Commonwealth or Supreme Court."33 No restrictions are placed on the amount in controversy. 84
Commonwealth Court
The Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the Commonwealth or any of its officers, acting
in their official capacity except (1) proceedings under the Eminent Domain Code and (2) "actions or proceedings in the nature
of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction
of the court. . ... -5
It also has jurisdiction of actions by the Commonwealth or
any of its officers (acting in their official capacity) except proceedings under the Eminent Domain Code. 36 And, finally, it has
the original jurisdiction transferred to it by the partial repealer
7
section of "ACJA".
30. § 204 (a). This section also sets forth the scope of review on such
allocations:
If the petition shall be granted, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review the order in the same manner as orders have
been reviewable heretofore on appeal pursuant to acts of the General Assembly, and the scope of review of the order shall not be
limited as on broad or narrow certiorari.
31. Id. § 205. The Supreme Court can assume such jurisdiction "[o]n
its own motion or upon petition of any party....
32. Id. § 201.
33. Id. § 302.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 401(a) (1).
36. Id. § 401 (a) (2).
37. Id. § 401 (a) (3). Section 508 of "ACJA of 1970" is a partial repealer section. It lists 119 Acts of the General Assembly and transfers
jurisdiction over the matters involved in the acts or sections listed from the
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County to the Commonwealth Court.
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The Commonwealth Court is given jurisdiction of appeals
from the courts of common pleas in "all civil actions or proceedings
to which the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his
official capacity, is a party .. .."3, The exceptions to this
jurisdiction are" . . .actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief
.
.
which are not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.3 9 It has appellate jurisdiction of criminal actions relating to rules, regulations, or orders of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth," authorized appeals from state administrative agencies first determined
in the courts of common pleas, 41 all appeals from local administrative agencies, 42 proceedings under the Eminent Domain Code or
where a question is raised regarding "the power or right of a condemnor to appropriate the condemned property. '4 It has appellate jurisdiction of final orders of the courts of common pleas in
[a]ll actions or proceedings arising under any county, institution district, city, borough, incorporated town, township, public schools, planning or zoning code under which
a municipality or other political subdivision or municipality authority may be formed or incorporated or where is
drawn in question the application, interpretation or enforcement of (i) any act of the General Assembly regulating the affairs of political subdivisions, municipality and
other local authorities or other public corporations or of
the officers, employes or agents thereof, acting in their
official capacity, or (ii) any home rule charter or local ordinance or resolution.. ..44
.",

Under Section 403, the Commonwealth Court is given exclusive jurisdiction of direct appeals from administrative agencies of
the Commonwealth including the Public Utilities Commission
45
and the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
Exceptions to this appellate jurisdiction are "matters relating
to the privilege of operating motor vehicles or tractors .. .,,4,the
Previously these cases were heard by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, being entered in its "Commonwealth Docket."

38.

Id. § 402(1).

39.

Id.

40.
41.

Id. § 402(2).
Id. § 402(3).

42.
43.
44.

Id. § 402(5).
Id. § 402(6).
Id. § 402(4).

45.

Id. § 403(1).

46.

Id. § 403(1)(i).

Liquor Code,47 and the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
Act or the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.48 Exceptions
covered under the latter two are appealable to the courts of common pleas. 49 Lastly, the Commonwealth Court has appellate jurisdiction transferred to it by Section 508, the partial repealer section
of the Act.50
Section 509(g) is a general repealer. It repeals all acts or
parts of acts inconsistent with "ACJA".51

III.

ANALYSIS

OF THE ACT

Before beginning the substance of this section two important
and interrelated points must be made. First, the model acts within
the framework of which "ACJA" will be analyzed are model judicial articles for constitutions and as such do not contain the details which are present in "ACJA". However, many of the concepts incorporated in these models can be applied to an evaluation
of this act. Secondly, it has been stated that although model acts
can set up the ideal system, each state must organize its judicial
52
system on the basis of its own peculiar history and traditions.
Thus, although "ACJA" may fall short of the standards set by
these models it must be looked at in light of the historical development of Pennsylvania's judicial system.
OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court
The first point to be dealt with is whether or not the Supreme
Court should have any original jurisdiction. The American Bar Association's Draft of a Model Judiciary Article for State Constitutions proposed that the Supreme Court have no original jurisdiction. 53 The ABA recommends that it only be allowed to issue
writs necessary or appropriate to its appellate jurisdiction.5 4 In
the "Comment" to this section one of the reasons forwarded for
the elimination of original jurisdiction in state supreme courts is
that such courts do not possess the fact finding facilities which
necessarily accompany original jurisdiction. 55 The Supreme Court
neither has these facilities nor should it necessarily have to be
47.
48.
49.
50.
note 37
51.
52.
53.
states:
A.
54.

Id. § 403(1) (ii).
Id. § 403(1) (iii).
Id. §§ 403(1) (ii), (iii).
Id.§ 403(2). As to the partial repealer section, see discussion at
supra.
Id. § 509(g).
T E PREPAPATORY CoMmITrE, supra note 2, at 50.
A.B.A., MODEL STATE JuniciAL ARrrcLs, Section 2 par. 2(A) (1962)
Original Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have no original jurisdiction, but it shall have the power to issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Id.

55. Id.
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concerned with issues involving the fact finding process.56 However, the validity of this argument as it applies to original jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be questionable.
The Supreme Court in 1936 stated that it did not take original jurisdiction to try factual situations. 7 However, it does seem that
questions of fact were being submitted to the Court on original
jurisdiction."8 This seems to have been the case particularly on applications for writs of habeas corpus. In 1951 the Court referred
to this and established the test for taking original jurisdiction
in such matters and also referred to the test in the other classes
of cases in which the Court can take original jurisdiction. 59 The
Court said that there must be imperative necessity for expedition
before they will take original jurisdiction. 60 This rule still seems
to be followed today. In Commonwealth ex tel. Sprowal o.
Hendrick the Court took original jurisdiction and cited Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy as the basis for this."' The reason
56. See note 65 infra on reducing caseload.
57. Gilwa v. U.S. Steel Corp., 322 Pa. 225, 185 A. 584, cert. denied, 299
U.S. 593 (1936).
58. Phila. Gas Works Co. v. Philadelphia, 331 Pa. 321, 1 A.2d 156
(1938).
See Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 366 Pa. 287, 77 A.2d
350 (1951), in which the court states:
In the current avalanche of petitions to this Court for writs of
habeas corpus, with increasing frequency, questions of fact are being submitted which require taking of testimony and exhibition of
court and prison records. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v.
Ashe, Warden, 362 Pa. 48, 66 A.2d 281.
59. Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 366 Pa. 287, 77 A.2d 350
(1951), in which the court states:
While under Sec. 3 of art. 5 of the State Constitution original
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court in habeas corpus,
original jurisdiction is also conferred 'in cases of injunction where
a corporation is a party defendant', or 'mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction' and 'of quo warranto as to all officers of the
Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the State.' In
applications to this Court to take original jurisdiction in cases of
injunction, mandamus and quo warranto, permission to so proceed
lies within the discretion of the Court and then only where the
necessity for such action is apparent....
Id. at 286. The Claudy court further stated:
Should there exist imperative necessity or apparent reason
why expedition is desirable or required, this Court in its discretion, may grant permission to proceed by original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus applications, as in other cases under art. 5 Sec. 3 of
the Constitution, supra. In the absence of such necessity or desirability, the interests of the relator and the Commonwealth will
be best served in this and similar cases by relator making application to the appropriate court where, with proper petitions, answers
and evidence (when indicated), that court will, when required,
make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter
such orders and decrees as it may deem appropriate ...
Id. at 287.
60. Id.
61. Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d
348 (1970).

for such a rule is clearly that a lower court can resolve factual
issues much easier than the Supreme Court. In Comnmonwealth
ex rel. Tiscio v. Martin the Superior Court said this in a note to
its opinion:
The obvious reason for this is that in the absence of
such necessity, the pleadings and factual issues are best
resolved6 2in the lower court from whose decree an order
will lie.
When the Court does assume original jurisdiction and factual
issues are presented it appears that the Supreme Court remands
the case to a lower court to make a determination of the facts.6 3
The conclusion can be drawn that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has established a standard whereby the only cases involving factual determinations which it will hear on original jurisdiction are those in which justice can only be achieved if it does take
such jurisdiction.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association's proposed judicial article
calls for no original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court except as
provided for in the Constitution. 64 Furthermore, the "Comments"
on this model judicial act, while speaking of the section which drastically limited direct appeals to the Supreme Court, said:
Our Supreme Court cannot function the way the highest
appellate court of a state should under modern conditions
with its present burden and subjected to the kind of cases
it must now accept. The time has clearly come to limit
the appeals which may be taken as of right to the Supreme Court.65
This is an additional indication of a general realization that state
supreme court jurisdiction must be limited if such a court is to
function effectively.
One last point should be raised with regard to original and
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
is now the head of a unified judicial system in Pennsylvania. It
must now devote much of its time to the administration of the
entire Pennsylvania judicial system. Administration is a very
demanding and time consuming task. 66 In view of the fact that it
is in this position, the court should not be required to have juris62. Commonwealth ex rel. Tiscio v. Martin, 180 Pa. Super. 462, n.1
at 466, 120 A.2d 307, n.l at 308 (1956).
63. Phila. Gas Works Co. v. Philadelphia, 331 Pa. 321, 1 A.2d 156
(1938) (the Supreme Court had sent the case to a common pleas judge to
make the finding of fact). Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick,
438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348 (1970).
64. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED JUDICIARY ARTICLE Section 2(b)

(1966).

65. Id.

66.

THE PREPARATORY

comment).

COMmITTEE, supra note

2, at 226 (under con
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diction over too many types of cases. The ideal solution might
be to make the Supreme Court purely a certiorari court hearing
67
only those appeals it deems important.
Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court
With regard to appellate jurisdiction the ABA's Draft of a
Model Judicial Article calls for direct appeal to a state supreme
court only in criminal cases imposing death or an extensive period
of imprisonment (25 years).68 The Pennsylvania Bar Association's
proposed article would allow direct appeal only when the sentence was death or life-imprisonment. 69 The proposal recommends
that the Supreme Court assign other appeals among the appellate
tribunals. T0 William Schnader, in his "Comments" on this proposal, says that this is the modern look and that the number of
cases in which a right of appeal to the Supreme Court exists
should be limited.71 Ideally, then, the Supreme Court should
perhaps have only direct appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
felonious homicide. All other appellate matters can and should be
handled by the Superior or Commonwealth Court on the basis of
their subject matter. This would allow the Supreme Court to become basically a certiorari court, free to administer a large judicial system and to decide those cases of great importance in the
72
state.
Jurisdictionof the Superior Court
With regard to the Superior Court, the ABA's Draft, referring to the Court of Appeals, gives it no original jurisdiction. 73
74
It is to hear appeals given to it by rule of the Supreme Court.
67.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, [HEARING] in re:

SENATE BILL No. 4, 160 (January 8, 1969). In testfying before the committee the Hon. Robert Woodside, although not referring specifically with
reference to the tasks of administration, stated that he felt the Supreme
Court should eventually become a certiorari court.
68. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 53, at § 2 par. 2 (B).
69.

PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 64, at § 2 (b).

70.

Id.

71.

PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED JUDICIARY ARTICLE Sec-

tion 2(b) (1966). Schnader's Comment and the PBA and ABA proposals
relate to constitutional articles so that they necessarily do not contain the
detail contained in "ACJA of 1970". However, they show the need for a
curtailment of the cases heard of right on appeals to state supreme courts.
72. Hearings of S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (1969).
73.

A.B.A., MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 3 (1962).

74.

Id.

However, it calls for that court to sit in divisions. 75 The Pennsylvania Bar Association's proposal contains basically the same
concept except that it does not call for the Superior Court to sit
in divisions and it allows the Superior Court to hear all appeals
which lie as a matter of right and which are not designated to an
appellate tribunal by rule of the Supreme Court. 76 It can be
seen that what is our Superior Court is envisioned as a court of
general appellate jurisdiction. "ACJA" has initiated the move toward this type of court in Pennsylvania. This is good since it
is important to lessen the burden on the Supreme Court. 7 As
has been stated, that court has the task of administering the
judicial system and should only hear appeals in important cases.
Jurisdictionof the Commonwealth Court
It has been argued by at least two eminent Pennsylvania
judges 78 that the Commonwealth Court should have no original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction may create many problems for
the Commonwealth Court. There must be facilities to hear such
cases. If a party does not waive his right to a jury trial, jurors
must be chosen for the case. Where should the jurors be chosen
from? Should they be from the area where the Commonwealth
Court is based? Or should they be from the area where the cause
of action arose? If they should be chosen from the latter
area, should they be required to come to Harrisburg or should
the Commonwealth Court go to them? 79 These are a few of
the questions which arise with regard to original jurisdiction
in the Commonwealth Court. 0
As far as appellate jurisdiction is concerned, the Commonwealth Court represents a great success in specialization. As will

75. Id.
76.

PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssocIATIoN, PROPOSED JUDICIARY ARTICLE Sec-

tion 3 (b), reads:

It should exercise such appellate jurisdiction, including such
review of the actions of executive or administrative officers or
agencies, as may be assigned to it by rule of the Supreme Court.
When no other court has been designated by rule of the Supreme
Court, appeals permitted by law shall be taken to the Superior
Court.
77. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINING
THE JURISDICTIONS OF THE SUPREME, SUPERIOR, AND COMMONWEALTH COURTS

2 (May 16, 1969). Hearings on S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
160 (1969).
78. Hearings on S.4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 43-44
(1969). They are statements made by Judge Bowman and the Hon. Robert
Woodside. For the opposite view see the testimony of former Attorney
General Sennett at 131.
79. Id.
80. Id. Also both Judge Bowman and the Hon. Robert Woodside say
it will fall short of their three appellate tribunal concept in Pennsylvania.
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be seen its cases are all within a specialized area."' The only
flaw which can be found is certain exceptions to its jurisdiction. 2
As far as the concept of a Commonwealth Court is concerned
it is an excellent idea.83 The Honorable Robert Woodside has
said, in testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1969,
that such a court may not have been necessary then, but certainly
would be in a few years.8 4 With the increase of cases on appeal
and the expertise required of the judges today, formal establishment of such a court can be very beneficial from the aspect of
specialization, a concept which will be fully developed later in this
Comment.8 r The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County could
not be expected to hear these cases indefinitely along with its
own.

86

IV.

ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CHANGES FROM PREVxOUS
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE

This section will discuss the real and the apparent changes in
appellate jurisdiction brought about by "ACJA". An attempt will
be made to analyze these changes and relate them to ideal concepts regarding appellate jurisdiction.
The basic concept which will be referred to throughout the
balance of this Comment is the concept of specialization. While
specialized courts have been developed in many of the states of
this country,8 7 Dean Pound has proposed a concept of one unified
court for an entire state.8 8 Within this system there would be
specialized judges rather than specialized courts.8 9 The judges
could be transferred from one branch of the court to another as the
need for their specialty arose.90
Pennsylvania, however, does not have a unified court but
rather separate courts within a unified judicial system. At least
81. See discussion on Pound in Section IV of this comment infra.
82. See discussion on exceptions to jurisdiction, pp. 21-22 infra.
83. E.g., Hearings on S.4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
(1969).
84. Id. at 10.
85. See discussion on Pound in Section IV of this Comment infra.
86. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, (1969)
(testimonies of Judges Woodside, Kreider, and Bowman).
87.

R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940).

The development of

specialized courts in many states can be seen throughout this book.
88. Id. at 277.
89. Id. at 272.
90. Id. at 276.

one authority has expressed the feeling that the goal of effective
specialization and its attendant benefits can be achieved without
a unified court.9 1 Specialization of judges, at least on the appellate
level, can be achieved through specialized jurisdiction of appellate tribunals. Thus, although Pennsylvania does not equal
Pound's ideal, his concept of specialization is still a very relevant
tool to use in analyzing the efforts of "ACJA" on our own system.
Supreme Court-OriginalJurisdiction§ 201
Two changes in jurisdiction which have been made relate to
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
A.

Cases of injunction where a corporation is a party defendant

First, the Supreme Court had original juirsdiction over cases
of injunction where a corporation was a party defendant.9 2 However, such jurisdiction is omitted from "ACJA". While the Supreme Court thus no longer has original jurisdiction in this area, it
should be noted that under prior law the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction in such cases was not exclusive, 93 and was in fact seldom exercised 4 The conclusion therefore is that this change
does not materially effect former practice in such cases but merely
recognizes it.
B. Issuance of writs of prohibition§ 201(2)
The same effects as mentioned above apply with regard to
another change in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Where
previously the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over cases
of mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction,9 5 this is expanded
by "ACJA". Under Section 201(2), the Court now has original
jurisdiction of "all cases of mandamus or prohibition to courts of
inferior jurisdiction .

. . ."I

Thus, its original jurisdiction is

expanded to include cases of prohibition. But as stated above, this
should not affect the caseload of the court due to the infrequency
of its hearing cases on original jurisdiction.
Also, this does not actually represent a change from previous
practice. The Supreme Court has an inherent power to issue
91.
(1962).
92.
93.
in these
94.

S.

SCHULMAN,

TOWARD

JUDICIAL

REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA
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PAL CONST. art. V, § 3 (1874).
Id. The Supreme Court was provided with original jurisdiction
cases but the article does not say that it will be exclusive.
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8 (May 16, 1969).
95. PA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1874).
96. Act No. 223, § 201(2) (Sept. 11, 1970).
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writs of prohibition since prohibition is the counterpart of mandamus and the Supreme Court has the constitutional power to
97
issue writs of mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the issuance of a writ of prohibition is really not
an exercise of original jurisdiction since the court only issues the
writ after an inferior court has entertained the case.98 In issuing
such a writ, the Supreme Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction, but protecting its appellate jurisdiction.9"
Supreme Court-DirectAppellate Jurisdiction§ 202
A.

Cases where a law is declaredunconstitutional§ 202(9)

The Supreme Court, under Section 202(9) of "ACJA," is given
direct appellate jurisdiction where a court of common pleas determines that a provision of law is unconstitutional. 10 0 Simply
raising a constitutional issue will not bring this jurisdiction into
effect. The provision must have been determined unconstitutional. 10 1 The Supreme Court does not have direct appellate
jurisdiction over this matter with regard to ordinances and administrative regulations. These are appealed to the Commonwealth
Court. 10 2 Their inclusion would transfer too great a load of cases
103
to the Supreme Court.
Previously, appeals involving constitutional questions went to
the Superior Court and then a right of appeal was allowed to
the Supreme Court. 0 4 Although no cases could be found by way
97. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426
(1948).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Act No. 223, § 202(9) (Sept. 11, 1970).
101. Id. This section states:
Matters where the court of common pleas has held invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or to the Constitution of this Commonwealth, any treaty or law
of the United States or any provision of the Constitution of, or any
act of Assembly of, this Commonwealth, or any provision of any
home rule charter.
102. Id. § 402(4); PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE Oi THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDIcIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION
DEFINING THE JURISDIcTIONS OF THE SUPREME, SUPERIOR, AND COMMON-

WEALTH COURTS 5-6 (May 16, 1969).
103.

PENNSYLVANIA

BAR ASSOCIATION

COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTA-

TION OF THE JUDIcIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINING
THE JURISDIcTIONS OF THE SUPREME, SUPERIOR, AND COMMONWEALTH

COURTS

6 (May 16, 1969). It should be noted that this proposal and "ACJA" are
not identical. However, the comments on this provision are valid as it is
identical to that enacted in "ACJA".
104. Law of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212 § 7 (c).

of example, logic dictates that the faster the Supreme Court rules
on a law that has been declared unconstitutional by a lower court
the better.
B. Right or power of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision to create or issue indebtedness § 202(8)
According to "ACJA" the Supreme Court now has direct
appellate jurisdiction "... over questions involving the right of
the Commonwealth or a political subdivision to create or issue indebtedness."' 0
This right or power must be called into direct
question for the Supreme Court to have direct appellate jurisdiction. 106 Although it would logically seem at first glance that
matters involving the Commonwealth or a political subdivision
should be heard by the Commonwealth Court, it should be noted
that matters regarding the creation or issuance of indebtedness
should ordinarily be decided as quickly as possible. 107 The need
for a speedy determination of the issue must overcome the aspect of
specialization. Therefore, it would seem that this would be a valuable jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to exercise. Furthermore,
the unique consideration involved in such matters forms the basis
for an argument that the Supreme Court is actually specializing
in cases involving debt issuance.
C.

Matters involving the practice of law § 202(6)

The Supreme Court formerly had direct appellate jurisdiction
in cases of disbarment '1 and suspension from the practice of law. 109
This has been- expanded by "ACJA" to include "other disciplinary
orders or sanctions relating thereto."' 1 0 Once again this seems
to be a move towards specialization with the Supreme Court hearing
all appeals involving the practice of law.
D. Allocatur § 204(a)
Another change from former practice is found in Section
204(a) which deals with discretionary allowance of appeals."" A
105. Act No. 223, § 202(8) (Sept. 11, 1970).
106. Id. This section explicitly states that their right or power must
be ". . . drawn in direct question."
107.

PENNSYLVANiA BAR AssocIAToN COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
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5 (May 16, 1969).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 191.4(9) (Supp. 1970).
109. Id. § 191.4(10).
110. Act No. 223, § 202(b) (Sept. 11, 1970).
111. Act No. 223, § 204(a) (Sept. 11, 1970) reads:
Section 204. Discretionary Allowance of Appeals(a) Final orders of the Superior Court and final orders of the
Commonwealth Court not appealable under section 203 of
this act may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon allow-
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similar provision appeared in an 1895 act but that act only required the allowance of appeal by one justice of the Supreme
Court. 1 12

The new section requires that two justices approve the

petition for allowance. 1 3 Research has not disclosed the reason
for this change. However, there are indications that the change
might have been a compromise
resulting from judicial desire to
4
curtail such appeals."
In any case, it does not appear that this change will have much
effect on the Supreme Court. First, it has generally been the
practice for all of the Supreme Court justices to participate in the
decision regarding petitions for appeal, as far as practical. 115 The
entire court considers it if the court is in session.116 Secondly,
the Supreme Court allows the petition only in exceptional circumstances. 1 7
Superior Court § 302
A. Tort and contract cases involving more than $10,000
One change brought about by "ACJA" is the transfer of appellate jurisdiction in tort and contract cases involving more than
$10,000 from the Supreme Court to the Superior Court. Section
202, relating to direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the courts
of common pleas, makes no mention of a monetary level above
which the Supreme Court would have direct appellate jurisdiction. Section 302, relating to appeals to the Superior Court,
grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to it from final orders
of the courts of common pleas "regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount involved, except such classes of appeals as
are by any section of this act within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court."" ' s Previously, specific reference was made that the amount in controance of appeal by any two justices of the Supreme Court
upon petition of any party to the matter.
112. Law of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212 § 7 (c).
113. Act No. 223, § 204(a) (Sept. 11, 1970).
114. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 159
(1969). The Hon. Robert Woodside stated:
There are some in the Supreme Court who are very anxious to keep
that one judge allowance. There are others on the Supreme Court
who would be very happy to have that changed so that allowance
could be made by only three judges.
115. In re Boyle's Liquor License, 190 Pa. 577, 42 A. 1025 (1899).
116. Platt-Barber Co. v. Groves, 193 Pa. 475, 44 A. 571 (1899).
117. Stais v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 378 Pa. 289, 106 A.2d 216 (1954).
118. Act No. 223, § 302 (Sept. 11, 1970).

versy could not be greater than $10,000 exclusive of costs.,," This
was specifically repealed by "ACJA".1 20 This can be beneficial
in leading to a specialization in the courts of Pennsylvania since
appeals in these classes of cases will no longer be split between
two appellate tribunals. 12 1 There seems to be no reason today
why classes of cases should be or were divided between the courts
122
on the basis of a monetary standard.
B. Adaptation of law to changing circumstances
The Superior Court can now adapt a law to changing circumstances without the Supreme Court first changing the law.123
Previously the Superior Court was bound to follow the decisions
of the Supreme Court since statute required that ". . . upon any
question whatever before the said court the decision of the Supreme Court shall be received and followed as of binding authority.' 1 24 This was repealed by "ACJA". 125 This repeal seems
to be based on sound reasoning since the Superior Court now
26
has jurisdiction of a general appellate nature.1
119. Law of June 24, 1899, P.L. 212 § 7(c).
120. Act No. 223, § 509(1) (Sept. 11, 1970).
121. See discussion on Pound in Section IV of this Comment infra.
122. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 160-61
(1969). In testifying before the Committee, the Hon. Robert Woodside
stated:

The Supreme Court now deals with trespass up to $10,000.
Any time you separate jurisdiction on a dollar amount, it raises
questions and problems. It ought never to exist where it can be
avoided. It can be avoided here and it should not exist.
In equity, that was the rule sometime ago, but that was
changed, as you recall it, so that the Supreme Court now has all
equity cases. In Orphans' Court, it was the Rule, that was
changed so that the Supreme Court now has all Orphans' Court.
In Quarter Sessions cases, in certain subject matter, that was
the Rule, and that has been changed so that the Superior Court
now has all jurisdiction from Quarter Sessions. That decision
ought to be between the Supreme Court and the Superior Court
and the Commonwealth Court, on the basis of subject matter and
not on the basis of dollars.
S. SCHULMAN, supra note 91, at 8 also espoused the removal of this distinction. In speaking of the Superior Court he states:
It will be modeled on the United States Courts of Appeals
and will hear in the first instance most appeals without regard to
the present statutory, arbitrary, monetary $5,000 jurisdictional
limit.
It should be noted that the limit in 1962 was $5,000. It was raised to
$10,000 in 1963.
123. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINING
THE JURISDICTIONS OF THE SUPREME, SUPERIOR, AND COMMONWEALTH COURTS 8
(May 16, 1969).

124.

Law of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212 § 10.

125.

Act No. 223, § 509(a) (1) (Sept. 11, 1970).

126.
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But how much of a change is this? The Superior Court has
twice, since the enactment of the above quoted statute, said that
if the Supreme Court's ruling was very old and its application
would be extremely unreasonable and unjust the Superior Court
was not bound to follow the decision. In Commonwealth v. Franklin,1 2 7 the Superior Court said:
In undertaking this inquiry into the legality of the
asserted authority we are aware of the fact that our
Supreme Court over a century ago would seem to have
already passed upon and confirmed the existence of such
power. In such circumstances there would ordinarily remain nothing further for consideration by a lower court
but compliance with the law as pronounced by the highest
tribunal of this Commonwealth. But, as we shall hereinafter indicate at greater length, none of the judicial authorities relied upon is of even comparatively recent date and
there are raised in this proceeding, for the first time,
constitutional questions of grave import. In the circumstances, we are bound to consider the impact of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
12 8
Constitution upon the statutes of this Commonwealth.
It should be noted that in this case the court did not completely hinge its refusal to follow the statute on the fact that the
law was antiquated. It stated that there was a new issue involved. However, in Manley v. Manley,129 the court went one step
further and cited Commonwealth v. Franklin as authority for not
following the prior decision of the Supreme Court. The court
stated:
As the rule was pronounced by the Supreme Court
and left unchanged by the legislature, we ordinarily could
do nothing about it, for we are required to follow the pronouncements of our highest court. .

.

.

However, this

court has had jurisdiction over divorce appeals for 65
years, and as far as we have been able to determine, during this time the Supreme Court has made no reference
in any divorce case to the rule on insanity stated in the
Matchin case. The rule was pronounced many years ago,
and there is authority for our ignoring an ancient higher
court rule which is unreasonable and unjust by all
known standards, and which has frequently been examined
and universally rejected by legal authorities and by courts
in other jurisdictions. See Commonwealth v. Franklin,
1952, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272.130
127.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1953).

128.
129.
130.

Id. at 154-55, 92 A.2d at 274.
Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
Id. at 263-64, 164 A.2d at 119-20.

It is submitted therefore that no significant change in actual practice will be brought about by the repeal of this provision since
the Superior Court will now operate under the rule of stare dec/sis. Under that doctrine the decisions of the Supreme Court are
to be followed as binding except in special circumstances which are
grossly unjust and unreasonable.1"'
Commonwealth Court-OriginalJurisdiction§ 401 (a)
The Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction under
"ACJA" of civil actions and proceedings by or against the Commonwealth with stated exceptions. 132 This, of course, follows
the idea that the Commonwealth Court is to be the court deciding
Commonwealth matters. One important matter should be pointed
out at this point. In civil actions against the Commonwealth the
court has exclusive original jurisdiction. 1 3 This requires that a
person bring an action against the Commonwealth only in the
Commonwealth Court. However, in actions by the Commonwealth, the court's original jurisdiction is concurrent with the
courts of common pleas.134 Thus, the Commonwealth has discretion as to which court it will bring the action in. Further, the
Commonwealth, by choosing the court of original jurisdiction, is
also in effect choosing which appellate tribunal will have appellate jurisdiction over the case. If the Commonwealth chooses
to bring the action in the courts of common pleas, the proper appellate tribunal would be the Commonwealth Court. 13 5 However,
if it decides to originate the suit in the Commonwealth Court, then
6
the appeals would be to the Supreme Court."3
There are special circumstances, such as in rem proceedings,
in which the Commonwealth must be allowed to bring the action
in a court of common pleas. But the question then arises as to
why the Commonwealth Court should not have original jurisdiction over all other actions by the Commonwealth rather than allowing the Commonwealth its choice of courts. It would seem
that if the Commonwealth is allowed to choose its forum then the
party bringing an action against the Commonwealth should also
be allowed to choose his forum, or neither should be allowed to
choose and exclusive jurisdiction of the matter be given to one
court. This court should be the Commonwealth Court since it
has jurisdiction over Commonwealth matters.
131.
415 Pa.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A.2d 189, aff'd,
139, 202 A.2d 55, reversed on other grounds 382 U.S. 399 (1963).
Act No. 223, § 401(a) (Sept. 11, 1970).
Id. § 401(b).
Id.
Id. § 401(1).
Id. § 203.
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Commonwealth CouTt-Appellate Jurisdiction § 402
A. Equity appeals involving state or local government matters
§ 402(1), (4), (6)
Whereas the Supreme Court previously had direct appellate
jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings in equity,'3 7 "ACJA"

transfers appeals in equity actions which involve Commonwealth
or local government questions to the Commonwealth Court. 38
Allowing the Commonwealth Court to have direct appellate jurisdiction of these matters appears to be a step in the right direction. By giving the Commonwealth Court jurisdiction over these
matters, "ACJA" preserves the Commonwealth Court as the court
hearing all appeals involving State and local government matters.
But, as mentioned above these are exceptions to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction in equity. Thus, equity appeals will
be heard by two different appellate tribunals depending upon the
subject matter of the case.
In preserving specialization in the Commonwealth Court,
"ACJA" has split equity jurisdiction between the Supreme and
Commonwealth Courts. This creates a dilemma with regard to
specialization. To allow the Supreme Court to hear all equity appeals would mean that it would be hearing appeals involving actions by or against the Commonwealth, fundamental questions,
and questions involving the Eminent Domain Code. Under the
concept of specialization these should be heard by the Commonwealth Court. To allow the Commonwealth Court to hear all
equity appeals would be expanding that court's jurisdiction beyond its prospective area of specialization. Thus, the division of
equity jurisdiction logically becomes a necessity if the Commonwealth Court is to specialize exclusively in governmental questions.
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 191.4 (Supp. 1970).
138. Act No. 223, § 202(4) (Sept. 11, 1970). These exceptions are found
in Section 402:
(1) All civil actions or proceedings to which the Commonwealth
or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, is a party,
except actions or proceedings in the nature of applications
for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the
court;
(4) All actions or proceedings arising under any county, institution district, city, borough, incorporated town, township, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a municipality or other political subdivision or municipality authority may be formed or incorporated or where is drawn in
question the application, interpretation or enforcement of (i)
any act of the General Assembly regulating the affairs of
political subdivisions, municipality or other local authorities

B.

Zoning appeals § 402 (a)

Other transfers which seem to reflect this trend toward specialization can be seen in matters transferred from the Supreme
to the Commonwealth Court. One such change is in jurisdiction
over cases relating to zoning. These were formerly appealable
directly to the Supreme Court. 139 Now exclusive appellate juris14 0
diction of these matters rests with the Commonwealth Court.
logiBecause zoning matters involve governmental divisions, the
4
cal court to hear these appeals is the Commonwealth Court. 1
C.

Criminal actions for violationof a rule or regulationof an
administrativeagency § 402 (2)

Section 402(2) gives the Commonwealth Court appellate jurisdiction over "[a]ll criminal actions or proceedings for the violation of any rule, regulation or order of any administrative agency
of the Commonwealth .. ..,,14 An excellent analysis of this jurisdiction appears in the Report of the Committee on Implementation of the Judiciary Article:
Since an agency frequently has a choice between civil
and criminal enforcement of its orders, it is important that
the same court review the matters regardless of the method
of enforcement selected. For example, Section 1301 of
the Public Utility Law (66 P.S. § 1491) authorized the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to impose civil
penalties of up to $50 per day for, inter alia, violations
of its regulations or orders, while Section 1302 of the Public Utility Law (66 P.S. § 1492) declares knowing violations
of, inter alia, regulations and orders of the Commission
a misdemeanor subject to certain criminal penalto be
ties. 143
D.

State and local government matters § 402(4), (5), (6)

Section 402, clauses (4), (5) and (6), allow appeal from decisions of the courts of common pleas to the Commonwealth Court.
or other public corporations or of the officers, employes or
agents thereof, acting in their official capacity, or (ii) any
home rule charter or local ordinance or resolution;
All proceedings arising under the Eminent Domain Code or
where there is drawn in question the power or right of a condemnor to appropriate the condemned property.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 191.4(7) (Supp. 1970).
140. Act No. 223, § 404(2) (a) (Sept. 11, 1970).
141. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 162
(1969). The Hon. Robert Woodside stated:
Now in addition to that you can take away from the Supreme
(6)

Court the appeals in zoning. There is no reason under the sun, in

my mind, why they should deal with zoning in the first instance.
142. Act No. 223, § 402(2) (Sept. 11, 1970).
143. PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssociATIoN COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINiNG
THE JuRIsDrcTIONS OF THE SUPREME, SUPERIOR, AND COMMONWEALTH COURTS 8

(May 16, 1969).
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These are good inclusions under the Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction as they involve appeals on state and local government
questions and from administrative agencies. 144 This is in keeping
with its specialized aspect.
E.

Direct appeals from administrativeagencies § 403

The Commonwealth Court is also given direct appellate jurisdiction over appeals from administrative agencies of the Commonwealth. 145 However, three exceptions are made: (1) violations
relating to the operation of a motor vehicle or tractor, 1"6 (2) Liquor Code cases, 147 and (3) Workmen's Compensation or Occupational Disease cases.'48 Previously, Workmen's Compensation and
Occupational Disease appeals went to the courts of common pleas
and then to the Superior Court. 149 Under the concept of specialization it would seem that these appeals should now go to the
Commonwealth Court. In fact, the first draft of "ACJA" provided for such appeals to go to the Commonwealth Court.150
However, this was changed in the subsequent drafts of the bill. Research has disclosed no reason why these cases are appealed
144.
(4)

Act No. 223, § 402(4), (5), and (6) which read:
All actions or proceedings arising under any county, institution district, city, borough, incorporated town, township, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a municipality authority may be formed or incorporated or where
is drawn in question the application, interpretation or enforcement of (i) any act of the General Assembly regulating
the affairs of political subdivisions, municipality and other
local authorities or other public corporations or of the officers, employes or agents thereof acting in their official capacity, or (ii) any home rule charter or local ordinance or
resolution;
(5) All appeals from local administrative agencies under the Local Agency Law or otherwise;
(6) All proceedings arising under the Eminent Domain Code or
where there is drawn in question the power or right of a
condemnor to appropriate the condemned property.
145. Id. § 403 (1) which states:
All appeals from administrative agencies of the Commonwealth
under the Administrative Agency Law or otherwise and including
appeals from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. the
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and from any
department, departmental administrative board or commission,
independent board or commission or other agency or administrative officer of this Commonwealth having statewide jurisdiction....
146. Id. § 403(1) (i).
147. Id. § 403(1) (ii).
148. Id. § 403(1) (iii).
149. Law of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art. 4, §§ 426 et seq. allows for appeal to the courts of common pleas. Law of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art. 4,
§ 427 allows for appeal to the Superior Court.
150. H.B. 1562,
, sess. 1969, § 403(1) (Printer's no. 1934).

to the courts of common pleas rather than the Commonwealth
Court.
Interlocutory orders § 501
Provision is now made for a discretionary allowance of immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if the final order would
be appealable to an appellate court.'
The P.B.A.'s Report on
Proposed Legislation Defining The Jurisdiction of The Supreme,
Superior and Commonwealth Courtsstates that:
ACJA § 501 (b)

...

is patterned after the interlocutory

appeal procedure of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) successfully
employed in the United States Courts of Appeals for a
number of years. In substance it permits a discretionary
review of interlocutory orders not presently reviewable
as a matter of right if the lower court and appellate
court agree that an immediate review should be had of
the question involved. In certain instances such a review
might save the lower 15 2courts weeks, or even months, of
unnecessary trial time.
It would seem therefore that the inclusion of this provision is in
the interests of effective judicial administration and also in keeping with the concept of specialization.
CONCLUSION

The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 has been compared to model judiciary articles for state constitutions and to the
ideal conceptualizations of authorities in the judicial field. It is
this writer's view that "ACJA" compares favorably with Dean
Pound's concept of specialization. Pennsylvania now has three
courts which are specializing in particular classes of appellate
cases. With regard to the classes of cases which seemed to be
distributed without a view to specialization, it has been seen that
other overriding considerations necessitated their inclusion in the
courts to which they were assigned. Thus, Pennsylvania may
be on the threshold of developing specialized judges in its appellate
courts.
151. Act No. 223, § 501(b) (Sept. 11, 1970), states:
Discretionary Allowance of Appeal-When a court or administrative agency, in making an interlocutory order in a matter in which
its final order would be within the jurisdiction of an appellate
court, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, it shall
so state in such order. The appellate court may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.
152. PENNSYLvANIA BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINING
THE JURISDICTIONS OF THE SUPREMvE SUPERIOR, AND COMMONWEALTH COURTS

11 (May 16, 1970).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

However, "ACJA" does fall short of the ideal as seen in the
model judiciary articles for state constitutions. But it must be
remembered that these were prepared for a different purpose
and do not contain the detail of "ACJA". Furthermore, these
models allow a wide discretion for the assignment of jurisdictional areas to the appellate courts. Thus, the contrast between
them and "ACJA" may not be as glaring as it appears on first
sight. But there is a contrast. Pennsylvania should continue to
work towards achieving the ideal as envisioned in these model
articles.
"ACJA" has brought about valuable changes in the jurisdiction of Pennyslvania's three appellate tribunals. Also, it was
shown that what, in certain instances, appeared to be changes institued by "ACJA" were, in fact, not changes at all. They
were merely recognitions of actual practice.
As a composite, "ACJA" must be praised although there are
some glaring defects in it. However, it has been stated that each
state must develop its judicial system with regard to its peculiar
history and traditions in this field.1 5
The Pennsylvania Bar
Association, which is aware of these factors in Pennsylvania's history, prepared a proposed "ACJA".5 4 The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 is almost identical to their proposal. This may
well be an indication that "ACJA" is the best that can be achieved
in Pennsylvania at the present time.
GEORGE

153.
154.
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supra note 3, at 50.
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